What the Molniya-2 is made of
28 documented parts and 35 photos, from recovered wreckage and the reporting on it. Each part gives its marking, maker and country where known, and links the record it comes from. The system itself: Molniya-2.
Where the parts were made
- People's Republic of China 14
- SpeedyBee, Shanghai Xinlong Semiconductor Technology Co., Ltd, AMASS, Hangzhou Zhongke Microelectronics Co., Ltd., Espressif Systems, COLORFIRE (Colorful Technology), MATEKSYS, ShenZhen Eong Elektronics Co., Ltd, SIYI
- United States of America 4
- Baoter XCHC Electron / Bourns, International Rectifier (Infineon Technologies), Intel Corporation, SpaceX
- Switzerland 2
- STMicroelectronics
- Taiwan 1
- Apacer
- Great Britain 1
- Raspberry Pi Ltd
Sources
- HUR War & Sanctions: FPV drone of the airplane type Molniya-2R · українською
- Open Source Munitions Portal — search its munition identification records
- Telegram, news and web reporting — each row names the post or article it comes from
Ukrainian pages read alongside the English: same items, markings and text.
FPV drone of the airplane type Molniya-2R
Raskat Start 107 personal computer
Персональна електронно-обчислювальна машина Raskat Start 107
Based on Mini PC F8 (PRC)
Photo: HUR War & Sanctions
Photo: HUR War & Sanctions
Photo: HUR War & Sanctions
- ESP32-U4WD
512024
DHP473190
UG02MBM074
Microcontroller
record ↗
Power module with optical isolation HW-532
Силовий модуль з оптоізоляцією HW-532
Photo: HUR War & Sanctions
-
N-channel MOSFET
record ↗
Photo: HUR War & Sanctions
Magnetometer
- STM32L
431CCU6
GQ24Z189R
CHN GQ 246
Microcontroller
record ↗
Photo: HUR War & Sanctions
Photo: HUR War & Sanctions
Photo: HUR War & Sanctions
Photo: HUR War & Sanctions
Satellite communication terminal
Термінал супутникового зв’язку
Starlink UTA-231
Photo: HUR War & Sanctions
Photo: HUR War & Sanctions
Photo: HUR War & Sanctions
Photo: HUR War & Sanctions
Photo: HUR War & Sanctions
Photo: HUR War & Sanctions
ZR10 camera with 3-axis stabilisation
Камера з 3-х осьовою стабілізацією ZR10
Photo: HUR War & Sanctions
From other sources
Plywood airframe
Open questions
What has not been published about the Molniya-2, and where the available evidence points: measurements from published photos, the physics, the parts its relatives carry, and the trade in the parts themselves. An indication is not a confirmation. Each one shows how it was reached; last reviewed 2026-10-23.
Also not yet established
- Video camera of the Molniya-2: what type is it, and who makes it? — A photo or teardown record of the video camera showing a marking, a maker's label or a model name.
- Plywood airframe: does recovered wreckage of the Molniya-2 show it? — A teardown record from HUR or another official body listing it, or a photo of it in recovered wreckage.
- Electric motor marked “Motor XV 540 KV SN252401110”: who makes it? — A maker's catalogue entry or datasheet matching the marking, or a teardown record naming the maker.
- Servo drive marked “25T”: who makes it? — A maker's catalogue entry or datasheet matching the marking, or a teardown record naming the maker.
What it runs
Firmware, navigation and link software reported for the Molniya-2 and the modules it carries, each with its source.
Windows 11
licensed copy running on the Mini PC F8 in the Molniya-2R (HUR)
YOLOv5 object detection on NVIDIA Jetson Nano (claimed)
Serhii Beskrestnov says Russian V2U and newer Molniya drones run the YOLOv5 detector on Jetson Nano boards, with classes including tanks, vehicles, railways, locomotives, warehouses and a "soldier with a weapon" (September 2026). Not confirmed by a published teardown.
Onboard target selection and terrain-image navigation (no-antenna version)
Ukrainian officials told The New York Times that the module in the drone behind the 6 July 2026 Zaporizhzhia strike was unencrypted, held terrain images for keeping course, and contained code listing the target types it was trained to attack; the operator set the area and the drone chose the final target.
Visual terminal guidance
CSIS describes Molniya terminal guidance as following visual salience and motion contrast rather than classifying objects, and as continuing when the operator link is jammed (April 2026).
Also reported
- Airframe — Two aluminium tubes for the fuselage, plywood centre section and wings; camera in the nose, electronics and batteries inside source
- Motor, flight controller, camera — Electric motor, flight controller, camera and most electronics carry markings of Chinese makers including FATJAY, SpeedyBee, Caddx, Huayi Microelectronics and Trex Technologies source
- Flight-controller microcontroller — STMicroelectronics microcontrollers inside the Chinese flight controllers source
- Motor control board — Converters by Vishay (USA) and capacitors by Rubycon (Japan) source
- Propulsion (Molniya-2) — Two wing-mounted motors, redesigned fuselage, longer range and reinforced warhead compared with the original source
- Mesh modem — Mesh-network equipment from China's Shenzhen Xingkai Technology, one of 11 unsanctioned Chinese suppliers identified by the Center for Defense Strategies source
- Onboard computers (Molniya-2R) — Raspberry Pi 5 microcomputer and a Chinese Mini PC F8 sold under the Russian Raskat label (LLC Novyi IT Proekt) source
- Reconnaissance camera (Molniya-2R) — Chinese SIYI ZR10 with 10x optical zoom and three-axis stabilisation, in addition to the forward FPV camera source
- Satellite datalink (Molniya-2R) — Starlink terminal carrying video from both cameras, telemetry and control commands source
- AI tracking module (reported) — An unfamiliar computer between the camera and the mesh modem, found by Serhii Beskrestnov in drone wreckage and reported as a SIYI AI Tracking Module II, a Chinese module sold to detect and track people and vehicles (February 2026) source
- Onboard computer (no-antenna version) — NVIDIA Jetson Orin minicomputer, photographed by New York Times reporters in two partly intact drones shown by Ukrainian officials; exact model not published (August 2026) source
Part records and photos: HUR War & Sanctions, Ukraine's Defence Intelligence database of foreign components found in Russian weapons, and the other sources named on each part. A marking, date code or country is given as the source records it.