Geran-5

Overview

The Geran-5 is a jet-powered one-way attack drone built by Alabuga in Tatarstan. It shares a name with the Geran-2, Russia’s licensed copy of Iran’s Shahed-136, but very little of that drone’s shape. Instead of a delta wing it has a tubular fuselage, a straight mid-mounted wing and a tail with small end plates. Ukrainian analysts at Militarnyi and Defense Express call it a small cruise missile or “missile-drone”, the same class as the low-cost cruise missiles now being built in the West.

Ukraine’s military intelligence agency, HUR, reported its first combat use in early January 2026 (Ukrainska Pravda). On 19 January it published the wreckage, a 3D model and a component list on its War & Sanctions portal. The headline figures there are a length of 6.5 m, a wingspan of 3.2 m, a maximum take-off weight of 850 kg, a 90 kg warhead, a cruise speed of 450–600 km/h, a range of 950 km, about two hours’ endurance and a ceiling of 6,000 m. HUR’s verdict, quoted by The War Zone, was that “it is difficult to consider this UAV an in-house development of the Russian Federation.”

By August 2026 HUR told Militarnyi that Russia was building about 3,000 Geran-4 and Geran-5 drones a month at Alabuga and had stopped making the Geran-3. It put Geran-2 output at about 2,800 a month, so the jet types had overtaken the piston Shahed copy; Militarnyi reads this as capacity moved over from the Geran-2 lines. HUR’s deputy chief, Maj. Gen. Vadym Skibitskyi, told RBC-Ukraine that Russia was trying to make its own turbojets but was still “completely dependent” on Chinese engines costing about $35,000–40,000 each, and that it briefly cut output in July while it switched the lines to the Geran-4 and Geran-5. Russia’s two jet types now account for a large share of each attack, and in some daytime raids for two-thirds of the drones launched (Kyiv Independent).

Design and propulsion

The design draws on Iran’s Karrar target-and-strike drone, which is itself widely seen as a derivative of the American MQM-107 Streaker (Defense Express). HUR says the wing layout was copied, though the wing shape differs slightly. According to HUR, as reported by ArmyInform, the skin, wings and tail are carbon fibre over a load-bearing frame of aluminium profiles and steel.

The engine is a Chinese Telefly TF-TJ2000A turbojet rated at 200 kgf (1,960 N), listed by HUR with the maker Telefly Telecommunications Equipment Co. Early Ukrainian accounts relayed by The War Zone named a smaller Telefly JT80. HUR’s later component list settles on the TF-TJ2000A, and the same engine has since turned up in some Geran-4 airframes. HUR also lists a separate launch engine. The drone leaves the ground from a rail launcher about 80 m long, roughly three times the size of a Geran-2 launcher. Satellite imagery published by the Telegram channel Strategic Aviation of the Russian Federation shows these launchers at the Tsymbulova drone base in Oryol Oblast. Russia showed the same launcher in its “virtual” Victory Day parade on 9 May 2026. Images of 29 September from the same channel (Telegram, reported by Militarnyi) show Tsymbulova growing fast: a new pad with eight dome shelters for jet drones and another launcher, room for six more Geran-5 launch positions, new drone garages and shelters moved underground. Drones left in the open fell from nearly 100 to about 10. In October the anonymous Ukrainian OSINT channel Absolutely Reliable Source published satellite images of what it says is a new Geran-5 launch site near Millerovo in Rostov Oblast, close to the Luhansk border (Telegram). A field that was empty on 1 September showed at least eight prepared launcher positions and 32 drone-preparation areas by 12 October, with drones being unloaded. Militarnyi puts the build time at about six weeks. The images have not been independently verified.

On the first examples the engine sat in an external nacelle on top of the fuselage. In September 2026 Militarnyi studied interceptor footage released by the SBU and the Wild Hornets group and concluded that the engine had been moved inside the rear fuselage. That would cut drag and the nose-down pitching moment of a high thrust line, at the cost of internal volume that could otherwise hold fuel. Ukrainian commentators have read the change as a push towards 600–700 km/h. This is an assessment from imagery, not an official finding.

The figures are not fully settled. HUR’s portal gives a 3.2 m wingspan, while Militarnyi and other outlets citing Ukrainian intelligence give “up to 5.5 m”. Range appears as 950 km on the portal and “about 1,000 km” elsewhere. The Kyiv Independent puts the unit cost at about $115,000, with the imported turbojet alone at around $40,000. A Russian war correspondent, Dmitry Steshin, claimed in Komsomolskaya Pravda that the jet Gerans cost $60,000–75,000 in mass production; that figure is unverified.

Electronics and navigation

HUR’s teardown found that most of the avionics are the same modules used across Alabuga’s Geran family. Every part, with its markings, maker and photos, is on the Geran-5 parts list.

• Kometa-M12, a jam-resistant satellite navigation system with a 12-element controlled reception pattern antenna (CRPA). HUR attributes it to the Russian firm VNIIR-Progress, with Pantes, PSB Technologies and Aviv Group named as involved companies (HUR).
• MINSOO V3 inertial navigation unit, which HUR describes as “probably SADRA MINSO type” (HUR).
• A flight controller unit (FCU), an air data unit, servo drives, a power distribution unit and a Li-ion 18650 battery pack.

The 16 foreign components HUR identified come from the United States, China and Germany. The flight controller and power unit each carry a Texas Instruments TMS320F28335 digital signal processor. Alongside them are a TI CAN transceiver (VP230 marking), a TI hex inverter, a TI voltage regulator, a TI LM258 op-amp, an Infineon power MOSFET and a Monolithic Power Systems step-down converter. Two CTS 50 MHz clock generators are dated 2024 and week 38 of 2025. China supplied a WCH CH343G USB-to-UART bridge and a Yantel PD150 RF power divider (HUR). The 2025 date code matters to sanctions enforcement. As DroneXL put it, it shows the flow of Western parts is live rather than old stock.

Datalink, video and mesh

The Geran-5 carries the Geran family’s “Borscht” Tracker V3, a Raspberry Pi microcomputer with 3G/LTE modems and external cellular antennas that reports the drone’s position over mobile networks. It also carries a Chinese Xingkay Tech XK-F358 mesh modem (HUR). Business Insider, cited by DroneXL, gave its retail price as about $8,100.

The mesh modem lets drones in the same wave relay control and video for one another, which extends the reach of a human operator well beyond line of sight. On 27 September 2026 Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov, adviser to Ukraine’s defence ministry, described how this worked in practice (Telegram). A Geran-5 struck the Inkom business centre in Kyiv while a jet Shahed circled at almost 3 km, relaying the Geran-5’s radio signals and filming the strike live. That second drone then flew on and hit a warehouse outside the city. Whether hidden relays inside Kyiv do the same job is a separate claim; what is known and what is not is set out in Relays over Kyiv.

Software and onboard AI

No firmware, operating system or open-source autopilot has been published for the Geran-5. HUR’s record of its flight controller, marked “Г5”, shows a TMS320F28335 processor and a CH343G USB-to-serial bridge (HUR). The tracker is visibly a Raspberry Pi wired to two USB 3G/LTE modems with SIM slots (HUR); on earlier Gerans, Serhii Beskrestnov says, such trackers report through Telegram bots. What runs on the Raspberry Pi is not public. The full comparison across the family is on the Geran-2 and Geran-4 pages.

The open question is navigation autonomy. In late September 2026 the Ukrainian monitoring channel Colonel GSh reported a Geran-5 K5 with a new fuselage and an OEKS (DSMAC-class) module. Such a module navigates by matching camera images of the ground against stored reference imagery, as the Kh-101 cruise missile does. The channel quoted a Russian war correspondent, Andrei Filatov, saying jet Gerans now use an autonomous optical system called “Susanin” that keeps them on route without satellite navigation or contact with the operator. Militarnyi stressed that the K5 name and the DSMAC-class module were not officially confirmed. A photo from the same channel shows a label on a recovered unit reading “Блок FCU Г5 K5-K Сусанин” (FCU unit, G5, K5-K, Susanin); HUR’s record of the first Geran-5’s flight controller carries the marking “Г5”.

On 5 October HUR described an “electro-optical correlation system” called Susanin on an updated Geran-4. According to Interfax-Ukraine, HUR added that a similar system is used on the “new Geran-5 K5”. Citing Defense Express, UNITED24 Media notes the consequence: such a drone does not need a constant mesh link to reach its target. HUR’s Geran-5 component page, last updated in January, still lists no optical correlation unit. On 10 October Serhii Beskrestnov wrote that a similar system, built around the “Susanin” flight controller, had recently been found on the Geran-4 and the Geran-5; he expects optical navigation to spread to cheap cruise missiles and longer-range drones next year (Telegram).

Warheads

HUR lists one warhead, the BCh-90, at about 90 kg (HUR). Its filling is not specified. That is the same mass class as the largest Geran-2 and Geran-4 warheads, and small next to the 480 kg of an Iskander-K or the up to 800 kg of a Kh-101 (Kyiv Independent). The Wild Hornets group has said the Geran-5 carries a larger charge than other Gerans, which The War Zone could not verify.

Variants

• First configuration (January 2026), with the engine in an external pod above the fuselage. Some reporting calls it an “E” or “Э” series; that label belongs to the Geran-2 E series, not to the Geran-5.
• Internal-engine version (reported September 2026), inferred from interceptor footage (Militarnyi).
• Geran-5 K5 (reported late September 2026), with a modified fuselage and the claimed Susanin optical correction (Colonel GSh).
• Air-launched version, under study. In January HUR said Russia was looking at launching the Geran-5 from Su-25 attack aircraft. Published diagrams show two drones under the wings, but no air launch has been confirmed (The War Zone).
• R-73-armed version, planned. Following Iran’s Karrar, which has carried an Azarakhsh missile, Russia is reported to be considering an R-73 infrared air-to-air missile for self-defence (Defense Express). No wreckage has shown one.

Combat use

After its January debut the Geran-5 was rarely filmed. In August 2026 the Russian channel Military Informant called footage of Geran-5 strikes “quite rare”. It credited the 50th unmanned systems brigade “Varyag” with hits on a Nova Poshta logistics hub and fuel depot in Novhorod-Siverskyi and on a gas compressor station, all Russian claims. Use rose sharply in September. Ukraine’s Air Force reported that on the night of 28 September Russia launched 165 attack drones, 79 of them jets (Air Force of Ukraine). That day a fast drone diving at a steep angle set the Presidium of the National Academy of Sciences in central Kyiv on fire, killing two people (Al Jazeera). The Kyiv Independent attributes the strike to a Geran-5. Russian channels have also claimed Geran-5 strikes on data centres and telecom nodes in Kyiv and Dnipro. On 29 September the Strategic Aviation channel estimated that the Geran-5 had grown from about 10% to about 75% of the drones launched at Kyiv in a month (UNITED24 Media); that is the channel’s estimate, not an official figure.

On 2 October 2026 Putin was shown both jet Gerans at the Centre-2026 exercise at the Chebarkul range in Chelyabinsk region. Ukrainian OSINT researchers at Evocation.info identified the presenter as Ildar Tazutdinov, an Alabuga executive whose role there the US government has documented (UNITED24 Media). The figures given for the Geran-5 at the display were up to 450 km/h, a 90 kg warhead and about 900 km range, below HUR’s 450–600 km/h and 950 km.

Countering it

The Geran-5 is the hardest Geran to stop. A senior defence engineer told the Kyiv Independent that it flies about 150 km/h faster than the Geran-4. As a result, interceptors have to engage it from the front instead of chasing it, “a much harder problem to solve.” Mobile fire groups and the cheap interceptor drones that defeated piston Shaheds are no longer enough. In September 2026 President Zelensky put Ukraine’s rate against all jet drones at about 55% of more than 2,730 launched, against over 90% for piston types (UNITED24 Media). Air Force spokesman Yurii Ihnat gave the Financial Times a similar picture in mid-September: about 60% of the new jet drones intercepted, against 90–95% for other types (LIGA). Single nights swing widely. On 7 October the Air Force reported 38 of 46 jet drones downed or suppressed, about 83% (Militarnyi), and officials reported 77% on the night of 13–14 October (Defense News). These figures cover all the jet Gerans, not the Geran-5 alone.

On 6 October the deputy Air Force commander, Col. Yurii Cherevashenko, told a parliamentary inquiry that Ukraine expected Russia to raise jet-drone speeds to 800–900 km/h, though no such speed had been recorded and the jets then flew at up to 600 km/h (TSN). Jets were about 40% of Russia’s drones, up to 60% on some axes, and the Air Force expected 80%. About 20 companies were working with the Air Force on jet interceptors; 14 were flight-testing, six had some kills and three had promising results. He did not expect deliveries at the needed scale before the end of November. He spoke of jet drones in general, not the Geran-5 by name. Ten days later the Russian blogger Yurii Podolyaka claimed that on the night of 16 October Geran-5s had switched to a boosted engine mode to outrun interceptors and reached 700–800 km/h (EADaily). He showed no evidence, and it sits against the Air Force’s statement that nothing above 600 km/h had been recorded.

Purpose-built interceptors have started to score, so far in small numbers. In September a crew from the 1020th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment used a Wild Hornets STING S to bring down a Geran-5 over Chernihiv Oblast at 425 km/h and above 3 km (Euromaidan Press). SkyFall’s P1-SUN Jetkiller, Quantum WIY’s SPYS (a propeller interceptor that can sprint to 600 km/h briefly) and an SBU delta-wing jet interceptor have also downed Geran-5s. Serhiy Sternenko, a drone-warfare adviser, said “there is currently no mass produced effective product”.

More kills followed, all claimed by the units or developers with video and none independently verified. The P1-SUN JetKiller kills were made by crews of Lasar’s Group, a National Guard drone unit, with a second Geran-5 destroyed on 2–3 October after the first on 30 September; the onboard video shows a head-on pass (Militarnyi). On 12 October former defence minister Mykhailo Fedorov said a new, unnamed interceptor had shot down two Geran-5s heading for Kyiv, its first combat results. His team and Lasar’s Group commander Pavlo Yelyzarov developed it in about a month, and the aim is a fully autonomous version (Interfax-Ukraine). On 8 October the “Spalakh” crew of the 1020th Anti-Aircraft Missile and Artillery Brigade used a jet interceptor supplied by the Serhiy Prytula Foundation to bring down a Geran-5 over Chernihiv region, flying at about 430 km/h at only 780 m. It was the brigade’s second such kill; the interceptor model was not named (UNITED24 Media). Earlier, on 23 September, the State Border Guard Service released footage of a Geran-5 brought down by its 105th Border Detachment, without saying how, and another had come down over Kyiv’s Holosiivskyi district in early September (UNITED24 Media).

Gun turrets have joined in. On 5 October Air Force spokesman Yurii Ihnat said the AI-aimed turrets around Kyiv had already shot down jet drones, Geran-5s among them (Ukrainska Pravda). Machine vision aims their heavy machine guns, which also limits their range; he gave no kill count. President Zelensky had said a day earlier that more than 12 turrets were in place in Kyiv and eight more were coming to Kyiv Oblast. UNITED24 Media names the system Sky Sentinel, with .50-calibre guns, and Ihnat put the overall interception rate against jet drones at about 50–70% (UNITED24 Media). A Russian channel argues that a reach of roughly 1.5 km leaves only seconds against a target this fast (Military Informant).

The fastest interceptors depend on their own datalink. On the night of 13–14 October Ukrainian forces found Starshield, the military service of Starlink, restricted: soldiers said the connection dropped when moving faster than about 160 km/h and that several missions were disrupted. Serhii Beskrestnov called the Starlink-linked interceptors “the most effective solution” Ukraine currently has against jet Shaheds (Ukrainska Pravda). President Zelensky said that when the speed was reduced, some jet Shaheds could not be intercepted (Ukrainska Pravda); in another statement he said the link was lost completely about two minutes after passing 161 km/h, and only inside Ukraine (Militarnyi). Who ordered the restriction is disputed: Reuters reported that it came from the White House, while Axios reported that the administration had no part in it. By 16 October Zelensky said the defence ministry had been told the speed was restored. The statements speak of jet Shaheds in general, not the Geran-5 by name.

Electronic warfare has limits against this drone. The Kometa-M12’s 12-element CRPA is designed to resist GNSS jamming, and the reported Susanin optical correction would further reduce reliance on satellite signals and on the operator link. Two other points for defenders come from Militarnyi’s analysis. Moving the engine inside the fuselage may lower the infrared signature from the front and sides, though the exhaust plume remains the main IR source. The drone’s speed also gets it mistaken for jet missiles such as Ukraine’s Dan-T. Further back in the chain, Ukraine has struck VNIIR-Progress, the Kometa maker, with an FP-5 Flamingo missile, and the jet launch sites at Tsymbulova and Donetsk airport have been located from satellite imagery. Analyst Fabian Hoffmann told the Kyiv Independent the biggest weakness is that “Russia is not yet able to mass produce the engine on its own”.

What remains unknown

• Whether the K5 and its Susanin optical correction are a separate production version, a retrofit, or a module shared with the autumn 2026 Geran-4. HUR has not published a Geran-5 K5 component list.
• Whether the localised Russian turbojet that HUR reports in the newest Geran-4 has reached the Geran-5.
• The true wingspan (3.2 m or up to 5.5 m) and the warhead filling.
• Whether the Geran-5 is still launched only from fixed ground rails, or also from aircraft as HUR suggested.
• How many Geran-5s are built, as opposed to the combined Geran-4/5 figure of about 3,000 a month.
• Whether any Geran-5 has flown faster than 600 km/h. A Russian blogger claimed 700–800 km/h on 16 October 2026; Ukraine’s Air Force had recorded nothing above 600 km/h as of 6 October.